In this paper we examine and compare the legal and institutional set-ups in China and India. China differs from most of the countries studied in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature: Its legal and financial systems as well as institutions are all underdeveloped, but its economy has been growing at a very fast rate. Despite its English common-law origin and British-style judicial system and democratic government, there is enough documented evidence to suggest that the effective level of investor protection and the quality of legal institutions in India are quite weak as well. However, this has evidently not prohibited growth in either country. Small and high growth firms in both countries make extensive use of informal and relationship-based arrangements to finance growth.
I. Introduction
We compare the financial systems of the two largest and fastest growing emerging economies of the world -China and India -to better understand their very impressive growth experience with institutions that clearly fall short of developed country standards. The two financial systems differ widely in their nature and evolution and yet reflect many common features. Transiting from a socialist system to a market-based system, China had no formal commercial legal system and associated institutions in place when its economy began to take off in the 1980s. India, on the other hand, has a long history of modern legal institutions and financial markets, and has inherited a set of rich institutions.
Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005 (AQQ) categorize the Chinese firms into three sectors: 1) the State Sector that includes all companies such that the government has ultimate control (state-owned enterprises, or SOEs); 2) the Listed Sector that includes all firms that are listed on an exchange and are publicly traded; and, 3) the Private Sector that includes all the other firms with various types of private and local government ownership. 1 They find that the standard law-finance-growth view works well for the State and Listed sectors: With poor legal protection of minority and outside investors, external markets are weak, and firm growth is slow or negative. However, the size, growth, and importance of these two sectors in the economy are eclipsed by those of the Private Sector. There, in spite of relatively poorer applicable legal protection and standard financing channels, growth is much higher. Effective, alternative financing channels and corporate governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationships support the growth of the Private Sector.
The State Sector has actually been shrinking with the ongoing privatization process, which includes firms going public. AQQ also notes that equity ownership is concentrated within the State for firms converted from the State Sector, and founders' families for non-state firms (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000, 2002) . The standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective in the Listed Sector. 1 The Private Sector includes the following types of firms: 1) collectively-and jointly-owned companies, where joint ownership among local government, communities, and institutions is forged; and, 2) privately owned companies (but not publicly listed and traded), where controlling owners can be Chinese citizens, investors (or companies) from Taiwan or Hong Kong, or foreign investors (or companies). See Appendix A.4 for more details.
Both the dividend ratio and firm value of Chinese firms are low compared to similar firms operating in countries with stronger investor protection, consistent with predictions in the law and finance literature that weaker investor protection leads to these outcomes.
For firms in the Private Sector the two most important financing channels during their start-up and subsequent periods are financial intermediaries, and founders' friends and families. Firms have outstanding loans from multiple financial intermediaries, with most of the loans secured by fixed assets or third party guarantees. During a firm's growth period, funds from "ethnic Chinese" investors (from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other countries) and trade credits from business partners also feature as important sources. Access to large scale of funding and increase in reputation are considered the most important benefits of going public while disclosure of valuable information to competitors and outsiders and substantial fees are the biggest drawbacks.
Despite the near absence of formal governance mechanisms, alternative mechanisms have been remarkably effective in the Private Sector. Perhaps the most important of these is the role of reputation and relationships (see Greif, 1989 Greif, , 1993 . In protection of investors in India, on paper, is one of the strongest in the world largely because of the English common-law origin of its legal system. Based on several widely used aggregate measures, they show that the effective level of investor protection and the quality of legal institutions in India is, however, far below the average for English-origin countries. 2 This is reflected in firm characteristics as well. Indian firms have much lower dividend payout and valuation than similar firms operating in countries with strong investor protection, but are closer to the firms in countries with weak protection. Equity ownership is highly concentrated within the founder's family and/or the controlling shareholder, even by Asian standards. Further, smaller firms in India exhibit symptoms of an even lower investor protection regime.
ACDQQ conclude that formal financing channels based on stock markets and banks are not essential for corporate operations and investments as long as alternative financing sources pick up the financing slack. Since the mid-90's the average Indian firm grew at an impressive compound annual rate exceeding 10%. Moreover, as in China, they point out that
within India too the SME firms grow faster, though they depend little on formal legal channels and use far less formal finance than their larger counterparts. This finding holds after controlling for all relevant factors (such as age, industry and assets size in initial years) and correcting for possible survivorship biases due to higher death rates among the smaller firms. It also appears to hold for other sample periods and sizes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III present aggregate economy-level evidence on law, finance, and institutions in China and India respectively Sections IV discusses the survey evidence collected from small firms in China and India.
Section V presents our conclusions.
II. Evidence on China's legal and financial systems and growth in the three sectors
In this section we largely draw upon AQQ to provide an assessment of China's entire economy, and then of the status of its legal and financial systems.
Status of China's economy
In July 2007, China had an estimated population of 1.32 billion people, the largest of any country. Moreover, only one-fifth of all "lawyers" in China have law degrees, and even a lower proportion of judges have formal legal education. 3 Measured by simple exchange rates, China's GDP in 1980 was US$180.6 billion while in 1990 it reached US$368 billion. Also note that the exchange rate between the RMB and US$ changed from US$1 = 4.25 yuan to 8.28 yuan in 1992, which introduced a significant downward bias for China's GDP figure in 1992. This is why using PPP-adjusted figures to measure GDP and its growth is more appropriate.
Another reason for ineffective enforcement of many new laws in China is the intrinsic conflict of interest between "fair play" in practicing law and the monopoly power of the single ruling party, especially in cases in which government officials or their affiliates are involved. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, and Shleifer (LLPS, 2004 ) find that China ranks among the worst countries in terms of political freedom as well as the protection of property rights. They also find that political freedom (constitutional rules) and measures of economic freedom (property rights, procedures of start-up firm) are positively correlated across countries, and that judicial independence accounts for the positive effect of common law legal origin in economic freedom.
However, China stands out as an exception to this rule, scoring extremely poorly on both political and economic freedoms and yet enjoying one of the fastest economic growth rates.
Finally, AQQ points out that in China the reforms accelerated in 1992, with the enactment of regulations governing enterprises with foreign investment. Since then, the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises of China, together with the 13-industry regulation board, have been trying to move China's accounting practice in the Listed Sector toward the IAS (International Accounting Standards). However, as with legal professionals, the most glaring problem in China's accounting system is the lack of independent, professional auditors. This implies that the proposed IAS-based standards may actually be counterproductive within China's current infrastructure.
Financial System
In Table 3 (combined from AQQ and ACDQQ) we compare China's (and India's) financial system to those of the LLSV-sample countries (LLSV, 1997a, 1998), using measures from Levine (2002) . China's stock markets, which have been growing very rapidly since 1990, are still smaller than those of most of the other sample countries, both in terms of market capitalization and the total value traded as a fraction of GDP.
We compare the development of the entire financial system ("Financial development"), including both banks and markets. Given all other countries' measures are based on private bank credit only, if we only include China's private bank credit, we find that China's overall financial market size ("Finance activity" and "Finance size") is smaller than the LLSV-sample average level, and each legal-origin group average. In terms of the efficiency of the financial system, China's measure is below all sub-samples of LLSV countries. Based on the above evidence, AQQ concludes that China's financial system is dominated by a large but inefficient banking sector.
Financial markets
China In summary, with an underdeveloped legal system, the fact that China has small external markets is hardly surprising. 
Banking sector
As AQQ point out, China's banking sector is dominated by four large and inefficient state-owned banks. The LLS (2002) result on the negative relation between government ownership of banks and a country's economic growth seems to apply well to China's State Sector and the status quo of its banking sector. However, this high government ownership has not slowed down the growth of the Private Sector. 4 Following LLSV, the score on the horizontal axis is the sum of (overall) creditor rights, shareholder rights, rule of law, and government corruption. The score of the vertical axis indicates the distance of a country's overall external markets score (external cap/GNP, domestic firms/Pop, IPOs/Pop, Debt/GNP, and Log GNP) to the mean of all countries, with a positive (negative) figure indicating that this country's overall score is higher (lower) than the mean.
The most glaring problem for China's banking sector is the extent of nonperforming loans (NPLs hereafter) within the four largest state-owned banks. A large fraction of these bad loans resulted from poor lending decisions made for SOEs, often due to political or other non-economic reasons. Limited data availability on NPLs, arguably a strategic disclosure decision of the government, compounds the problem. This lack of disclosure of NPLs only fuels speculation that the problem must be severe. For example, Lardy (1998) argues that if international standards were used, the existing NPLs within the state-owned banks as of the mid-1990s would make these banks' total net worth negative. financial crisis, and the period during which the Japanese banking system was disturbed by the prolonged NPL problem. Moreover, the profitability of China's banking system, measured by the return to equity or assets, is also among the lowest in the same group of economies (Table 5-B) .
In recent years the Chinese government has taken active measures to resolve this problem. Four state-owned asset management companies were formed with the goal of assuming these NPLs and liquidating them. Information from these companies' auction data shows that the cash recovery on the bad loans ranges from 8% to 60%. State-owned banks have also improved their loan structure by increasing loans made to individual lenders while being more active in risk management and monitoring of loans made to SOEs. For instance, the ratio of consumer lending to total loans made for the four state-owned banks increased from 1% in 1998 to 10% in 2002.
There has also been a boom in the entry and growth of non-state financial intermediaries, and this trend is expected to continue with more foreign banks entering the domestic credit markets as a result of China's entrance into the WTO. In 1997, total new loans made by the four largest state-owned banks accounted for more than 75% of all new loans, while new loans made by "shareholding" banks accounted for less than 7%. In 2001, the share of new loans made by state-owned banks dropped to 49% while the fraction of new loans made by shareholding banks rose to 23.5%. All the above facts taken together can explain why NPLs have been falling in recent years, as reflected in Table 5 -A.
Growth in the State, Listed, and Private sectors
The These patterns are particularly important for China, given its vast population and potential problem of unemployment.
III. The Institutional Environment in India -An Assessment
At independence from the British in 1947, India inherited one of the world's poorest economies. The manufacturing sector accounted for only one tenth of the national product.
However, particularly in contrast to China, the Indian economy also had arguably the best formal financial markets in the developing world, with four functioning stock exchanges (one of them, BSE, the oldest in Asia) and clearly defined rules governing listing, trading and settlements; a well-developed equity culture if only among the urban rich; an old and In 2004, 52% of India's GDP was generated in the services sector, while manufacturing and agriculture accounted for 26% and 22% respectively. In terms of employment, however, agriculture accounted for about two-thirds of the total labor force (almost half billion), indicating both poor productivity and widespread underemployment in the sector. Over 90% of the labor force works in the "unorganized sector."
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III.1 Law, Institutions and Business Environment
Perhaps the most striking fact about India's legal system is the difference between investor protection provided by the law (de jure) as opposed to protection in practice (de facto). Table 2 Next, we consider two measures for the quality of accounting systems. The disclosure requirements index (from 0 to 1, higher score means more disclosure; LLS 2006) measures the extent to which listed firms have to disclose their ownership structure, business operations and corporate governance mechanisms to legal authorities and the public. India's score of 0.92 is higher than the averages of all LLSV subgroups of countries, including the English origin countries, suggesting that Indian firms must disclose a large amount of information. However, this does not imply the quality of disclosure is also good. In terms of the degree of earnings management (higher score means more earnings management; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003), India's score is much higher than the average of English origin countries, and is only lower than the German origin countries, suggesting that investors have a difficult time in evaluating Indian companies based on publicly available reports. It seems that while Indian companies produce copious amounts of data, form triumphs over substance in disclosure and with an accounting system that allows considerable flexibility, there is enough room for companies to hide or disguise the truth.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the legal system is of primary importance for other measures, India's score is lower than the averages of all the subgroups of LLSV countries, suggesting that India's legal institutions are less effective than those of many countries, and that it will be more difficult for India to adopt and enforce new legal rules and regulations than other countries.
Finally, as for the business environment in India, a recent World Bank survey found that, among the top ten obstacles to Indian businesses, the three which the firms surveyed considered to be a "major" or "very severe" obstacle and exceeding the world average are corruption (the most important problem), availability of electricity, and labor regulations. Threat of nationalization or direct government intervention in business is no longer a major issue in India. With rampant tax evasion, the shadow economy in India is significant. It is estimated to be about 23% of GDP. 6 Creditor and investor rights were largely unprotected in practice, with banks having little bargaining power against willful defaulters. Large corporate houses often got away with default, or got poor projects financed through the state-owned banking sector, often by using connections with influential politicians and bureaucrats. To summarize, despite strong protection provided by the law, legal protection is considerably weakened in practice due to an inefficient judicial system, characterized by overburdened courts, slow judicial process, and widespread corruption within the legal system and government. While the need for judicial and legal reforms has long been recognized, little legislative action has actually taken place so far (Debroy (2000)).
Currently, the government is trying to emulate the success of China by following the Special Economic Zone approach rather than overhauling the entire legal system.
III.2 Financial/Business Laws and Regulations in India
Red tape and regulations still rank among the leading deterrents for business and It is almost twice as hard to fire people in India as in China though it is much easier to hire in India . With Indian states having considerable variation in their labor laws, Besley and Burgess (2004) show that during the three and half decades before liberalization began in 1991, Indian states that followed more pro-worker policies experienced lower output, investment, employment and productivity in the registered or "formal" sector and higher urban poverty with an increase in informal sector output.
In the area of credit availability, India reveals considerable paucity of credit quality information through the use of public registry or coverage of private bureaus.
However, India's excellent investor protection provisions in the law should be viewed together with her performance in contract enforcement where the number of procedures and time delays are about double that in OECD countries and the costs of contract enforcement about four times that in China. Infrastructure also lags in India with costs of shipping more than twice that of China's.
As for securities markets regulation, using the framework of La Porta et al (2006) that focuses on disclosure and liability requirements as well as the quality of public 
III.3 Stock Exchanges in India
India currently has two major stock exchanges: the National Stock Exchange The Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI) has introduced a rigorous regulatory regime to ensure fairness, transparency and good practice. For example, for greater transparency, SEBI has mandated mandatory disclosure for all transactions where total quantity of shares is more than 0.5% of the equity of the company. Brokers disclose to the stock exchange, immediately after trade execution, the name of the client in addition to trade details; and the Stock exchange disseminates the information to the general public on the same day.
The new environment of transparency, fairness and efficient regulation led BSE, in 1996, to also become a transparent electronic limit order book market with an efficient trading system similar to the NSE. Equity and equity derivatives trading in India has skyrocketed to record levels over the course of the last ten years.
In 2005, about 5000 companies were listed and traded on NSE and/or BSE. While the dollar value of trading on the Indian stock exchanges is much lower than the dollar value of trading in Europe or in the US, it is important to note that the number of equity trades on BSE/NSE is ten times greater than that of Euronext or London, and of the same India ranks second last in the world in enforcing contracts (Table xx Panel A) .
Delays and costs of court cases are the major factors. By contrast, China ranks among the top 20 countries in this respect.
III.5 Indian Courts -an assessment
Djankov et al (2003) (DLLS) in their analysis of "formalism" in the judicial
process around the world, gave India a score of 3.34 on its formalism index, higher than the English-origin average of 2.76 but slightly lower than the average for all countries, 
IV. Survey Evidence on small firms in China and India
The overall institutional features captured in the foregoing macro analysis are reflected in their effects on small business as revealed by survey evidence of small firms in China and India. Both countries have exhibited remarkable growth in recent years.
However, when it comes to financing small and medium firms, that form the bulwark of growth and employment, financing seems to be driven in a major way by informal arrangements rather than legal assuarances.
A. China
AQQ provides survey information on how firms in the Private Sector raise funds, their various growth paths, and the alternative mechanisms employed by owners that can substitute for formal corporate governance mechanisms.
It is perhaps not surprising that during the start-up stage, funds from founders' family and friends are an important source of financing. Moreover, funds from friends, in the form of private loans and equity, are also very important during the firm's subsequent growth period. In some cases there are no formal written contracts between the friends/investors and the entrepreneurs, implying that reputation-and relationship-based implicit contractual agreements have worked effectively. Internal financing, in the form of retained earnings, is also high -survey firms retained an average of 55% to 65% of their net income for reinvestment during the initial two to three years of existence.
Funding from financial intermediaries is one of the most important sources for the surveyed firms. In terms of start-up financing, over 40% of firms surveyed regard "banks" as either a "very important" (25-50% of total funding needs) or an "extremely important" (more than 50% of total funding needs) financing source. On average, each Competition is stiff in this sector. Over 60% (30%) of firms believe that if their own firm were not run efficiently and were to find itself in financial distress, it is "possible" ("very likely") its assets would be purchased by another firm or investor; no one answered it is "not possible" for this to occur. 40% of surveyed firms believe that if their firm were not operating efficiently, within three to six months 20% of its market share would be taken away, while 80% of firms' founders/executives believe the entire market share of the firm would be taken away in two years. When asked about what type of losses concern them the most if the firm were to fail , every firm's founders/executives (100%) said reputation loss is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic losses are of major concern.
The success of a firm in the Private Sector in China depends crucially on the support from local government. Over 40% of survey firms state the local government "supports" the growth of the firm without demanding profit sharing, while for some other firms, the government is either a partial owner or demands profit sharing without investing in the. The supportive attitude of the local government toward firms in the Private Sector is remarkable considering the fact that the Chinese government is widely regarded as corrupt and disrespectful of property rights.
B. India
ACDQQ conduct similar surveys to study the extent to which the formal legal environment directly supports and regulates businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises which form an increasingly important part of the Indian industry. This seems to indicate that the small firms sector operate in a system virtually governed through informal mechanisms based on trust, reciprocity and reputation with little recourse to the legal system and deals with widespread corruption.
Over 80% of the firms surveyed needed a license to start a business, and for about half of them obtaining it was a difficult process. Government officials were most often the problem solved usually through payment of bribes or friends of government officials to negotiate. Clearly, networks and connections are of crucial importance in negotiating the government bureaucracy.
As for conducting day-to-day business, legal concerns are far less important to them than the unwritten codes of the informal networks in which firms operate. In cases of default and breach of contract, the primary concern is loss of reputation, followed closely by loss of property, with the fear of legal consequences being the least important concern.
About half of the firms surveyed did not have a regular legal adviser and less than half of those that did had lawyers in that capacity. For mediation in a business dispute or to enforce a contract, the first choice was "mutual friends or business partners". Only 20% of the respondents mentioned going to courts as the first option indicating that the legal system, while not as effective as the informal mechanisms, is not altogether absent.
The informal system, however, is not perfect in resolving disputes and has its costs. About half of the respondents experienced a breach of contract or non-payment with a supplier or major customer in the past three years. Over a third of them renegotiated while over 40% did nothing but continued the business relationships with the offending parties.
In general, the business environment of the SME sector is marked by strong informal mechanisms like family ties, reputation and trust. Legal remedies though present, are far less important than the rules of the informal networks.
V. Concluding Observations
In this paper we examine and compare the formal systems of law and finance in China and India and the alternative institutional arrangements and governing mechanisms in the two countries, and the relation between the development of these systems and their economic growth.
With one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world, China differs from most of the countries studied in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature, and is an important counterexample to the existing findings: Its legal and financial systems as well as institutions are all underdeveloped, but its economy has been growing at a very fast rate. More importantly, the growth in the Private Sector, where applicable legal and financial mechanisms are arguably poorer than those in the State and Listed sectors, is much faster than that of the other sectors. The system of alternative mechanisms and institutions plays an important role in supporting the growth in the Private Sector, and they are good substitutes for standard corporate governance mechanisms and financing channels.
India too has a special place among the countries studied in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature. Despite its English common-law origin and British-style judicial system and democratic government, there is enough documented evidence to suggest that the effective level of investor protection and the quality of legal institutions in India are quite weak. We examine the legal and business environment in which Indian firms operate and compare our results to those from other countries.
Growth in both these countries appears to have taken place in spite of their legal and institutional settings rather than because of these factors. Survey evidence points out that in both countries, small firms rely extensively on non-formal and relational avenues of fundraising symptomatic of poor effective investor protection.
The results of this paper have important implications for future research and policy.
As legal and institutional reform in India and China gradually fill the gaps in investor protection, should they seek to supplant the relational arrangements that seem to work well in these countries or should policymakers strive to sanctify such arrangements with legal recognition. Are Western-style laws and institutions the universal answer for promoting growth or do the country-specific solutions to institutional lacunae provide better alternatives? It is important to answer these broader questions before embarking on wideranging legal and institutional reforms -in China, India as well as elsewhere in the world. Notes: * = the numerical results for countries of each legal origin group is calculated based on a value-(GDP of each country) weighted approach; ** : Structure indices measure whether a country's financial system is market-or bank-dominated; the higher the measure, the more the system is dominated by markets. Specifically, "structure activity" is equal to log(value traded/bank credit) and measures size of bank credit relative to trading volume of markets; "structure size" is equal to log(market cap/bank credit) and measures the size of markets relative to banks; "structure efficiency" is equal to log(market cap ratio×overhead cost ratio) and measures the relative efficiency of markets vs. banks; finally, "structure regulatory" is the sum of the four categories in regulatory restriction, or the degree to which commercial banks are allowed to engage in security, firm operation, insurance, and real estate: 1-unrestricted; 2-permit to conduct through subsidiary; 3-full range not permitted in subsidiaries; and 4-strictly prohibited. *** : Financial development variables measure the entire financial system (banking and market sectors combined), and the higher the measure, the larger or more efficient the financial system is. Specifically, "finance activity" is equal to log (total value traded ratio×private credit ratio), "finance size" is equal to log (market cap ratio×bank private credit ratio), and "finance efficiency" is equal to log (total value traded ratio/bank overhead cost). Notes: All figures are from http//:www.world-exchanges.org, the web site of the international organization of stock exchanges. Concentration is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year coming from the turnover of the companies with the largest market cap (top 5%). Turnover velocity is the total turnover for the year expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization. The profitability is measured as the return on average equity (ROAE), and return on average assets (ROAA). The latter is presented in the brackets. Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.9 11.6 74.1
Figure 1 Investor Protection and External Financing -International Comparison
The figure compares India's legal system and external financial markets to those of LLSV country groups and the other emerging markets (as of 2005) as well as various legal origin country-groups. The score on the horizontal axis measures overall investor protection in a country. It is the sum of creditor rights, anti-director rights, corruption perception index, and legality index minus the legal formalism index from Table 2 . For China, the score on the legality index was not available. Hence, we have used the Rule of Law score from International Country Risk Guide instead. Each score is re-scaled on a 0 to 10 scale before being included in the final sum. The final sum is then rescaled on a 0 to 10 scale also. The vertical axis measures the (relative) size of that country's external markets and is given by the sum of the ratios of (private) bank credit and market capitalization to GDP from Table 3 
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